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CHARACTERISTICS AND CONSTITUTIONALITY OF
MEDICAL LEGISLATION
R IGHT to practice medicine regulated by statute.-In the absence
of a statute upon the subject, any person is at liberty to practice
medicine or surgery or both. This is the common law. And yet in
the absence of a statute the physician necessarily assumes certain
responsibilities that grow out of his relation to those whom he'treats.
He is bound to bring to the discharge of his duties the learning, skill
and diligence usually possessed and exercised by physicians simi-
larly situated. In other words, while in the absence of statutory
regulation, the door of the profession is open to all, the one who
enters cannot escape the common law responsibility for his acts.'
Medical legislation in England.v-It was early apparent that the
protection to the public afforded by the common law, if protection it
could 'be called, was entirely inadequate. In England as early as
142r a statute upon the subject was passed by Parliament, giving
authority to the Lords of the King's Council to prescribe ordinances
governing the practice of physicians and surgeons.2 Other statutes
relating to the subject were enacted subsequently from timeto time.3
Reference to the more important is found in the note, but comment
upon them is not necessary other than to suggest that under the
earlier legislation in England. practitioners were divided into three
classes, known respectively as physicians, surgeons and apothecaries.
The status of each class was distinct as were the functions; the
classes were governed by different statutes and charters, and the
I See Logan v. Weltmer, zSo Mo. 322, 79 S. V.r - Rep. 655. 103 Am. St. Rep. 573,
64 L. R. A. 969, and Nelson v. Harrington, 72 Wis. 591, 40 N. MX. Rep. 228. 7 Am.
Sf. Rep. goo, i L. R. A. 719.
: 9 Henry V, 1421 Rotuli Par. 130.
1
See 3 Hen. vIii. c. Tz; 14 and Y5 Hen. VIII, c. 5; 32 Hen. VIII, c. 40.
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members of each pursued their callings independently of one another.
It is perhaps worthy of note in this connection that the art of sur-
gery was formerly practiced by barbers and that the practice by them
was recognized and regulated in England by charter and statute.
4
The different branches of the medical profession in England were
brought together under one governing body by the medical act of
I858.' This act and its different amendments6 constitute what are
known in England as the Medical Acts. By these _acts, admission
to the profession and the professional conduct of the practitioner
are under the supervision, direction and control of "The General
Council of Medical Education and Registration. of the United King-
dom." This council, which now consists of thirty members, is made
up by the appointment by the Crown of five members, the selection
by the finiversities and medical colleges of twenty members and the
election by the registered medical practitioners of five members. The
Privy Council has a general power of supervision over this Medical
Council. A critical examination of the English medical acts would
be beyond the purpose and scope of this article. Suffice it to say that
they provide for thorough qualifying examinations to be held by des-
ignated medical authorities and for a system of complete registra-
tion of those who are entitled to practice. The legislation seems
well adapted for keeping out of the recognized profession those who
are not qualified for the practice and for regulating the professional
conduct of practitioners. But the laws apparently permit a person
to practice without registration, although such a practitioner is for-
bidden to take the title of a licensed physician and cannot recover in
the courts for his services; neither can he give valid certificates of
death.7
Medical legislation in the United States.--In the United States
at the present time admission to the practice of medicine and sur-
gery, the revocation of licenses, and &unishment for practicing with-
out having been regularly licensed so to do, are regulated by statute
in every state. The medical legislation of the different states has
' The barbers of London obtained a charter of incorporation from Edw. IV in 146x.
In 1540 the surgeons and barbers of London were incorporated and were made one com-
pany, and their respective duties and privileges were prescribed. 32 Hen. VIII, c. 42.
Other legislation touching the subject will be found in 34 and 35 Hen. VI1, c. 8, and
in x8 Geo. II, c. is, the latter being an act making the surgeons and barbers of London
two separate and distinct corporations.
•21 and 22 Vict., c. 90.
0 See 22 Vict, c. 2x; 23 and 24 Vict., c. 7 and c. 66; 39 and 40 Vict., c. 4o and c. 41,
and 49 and So Vict, c. 48.
7 See generally upon the English Medical Acts, 8 Encyclopaedia of the Laws of
England, pp. 346-350; also Abstract of "Laws regulating the Practice of Medicine in
the. United States and Elsewhere" (x2th Ed.), published by the American Medical Asso-
ciation, pp. icO-ixo.
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been by no means uniform, although an improvement in that regard
in recent years is noticeable. In a number of the states the medical
statutes are now comprehensive and thorough, and through them
much undoubtedly has been and will be accomplished in the way of
protection to the public from the results of ignorance and fraud and
the raising of professional standards. While a critical review of this
legislation cannot be attempted in an article of limited extent, a gen-
eral consideration of its prominent and characteristic features may
be of service.
The legislation of the different states at the present time provides
for a state board of medical examiners. This board as a rule is
appointed by the governor,8 the statute sometimes providing for a
list of names made up by the different medical societies from which the
appointees may be selected.9 But in most of the states this provision
is not found, the governor being in no way restricted by suggestions
from medical societies. In many, probably in the majority, of the
states, different schools of medicine are in some way represented in
the body or bodies whose function it is to supervise admission to the
practice of medicine.10 Sometimes the necessary authority is cen-
tered in a single board, the members of which must be appointed
frbm certain schools that are named .in the statute.
11 Separate and
sIn New York the members of the board are appointed by the Regents of the Uni-
versity of the State of New York. 2 Birdseye's R. S., Codes and General Laws of
New York (3rd Ed.), p. 2837, § 14r. And in Connecticut the statute provides for
three examining boards, to be appointed by the state board of health from nominations
submitted by the regular, homeopathic and eclectic medical societies of the state. See
Public Acts of Conn., 1907, PP. 642, 643.
9 For example, in Michigan it is provided that the appointees of the governor may
be chosen from lists submitted to him biennially by each of the four legally incorporated
.state medical societies, namely, the societies of the regular, homeopathic, eclectic and
physio-medical schools. Public Acts, 1899, p. 369. In Pennsylvania the governor
appoints three boards of medical examiners, representing the regular, homeopathic and
eclectic medical societies of the state, these societies furnishing a list of names from
which selection can be made. 3 Purdon's Digest (13 th Ed.), p. 3514, §§ 20-22. A
similar provision will be found in several of the states.
io In the following states there seems to be no provision for the representation of
different schools upon the examining board: Alabama, Colorado, Mississippi, Missouri,
Montana, New York, North Carolina, Oklahoma, Washington, West Virginia and
Wyoming. See "Laws (abstrsct)'regulating the Practice of Medicine in the United
States and Elsewhere!' (12th Ed.), published by American Medical Association.
"For example, in California, the board of medical examiners consists of eleven
members who are appointed by the governor, five from a list of ten names furnished
by the California State Medical Society (regular), and" two each from lists of 
four
names furnished by the state homeopathic, eclectic and osteopathic societies respect-
Ively. Statutes and Amendments to the Codes (1907, Extra Session), p. 252. In Indi-
ana the board consists of six members, the statute providing that "no school or system
of medicine shall have a majority representation on such board" ana further "that 
each
of the four schools or systems of medicine having the largest numerical representation
in the state shall have at least one representative on said board." 
See a Homer's Anno-
tated Statutes (Ind. 29ox), c. 82 A, § 53sd;. Indiana. Acts, 190S, C. XS, p. 194. 
In
Michigan the board consists of ten members, five from the regular school, two from
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distinct boards, each representing a particular school are not
unusual. 12 And in a few states the functions ordinarily exercised
by examining boards are imposed upon boards of health.13
The statutes usually require that application for a license to prac-
tice shall -be made to the examining board in writing, and that such
application shall be accompanied by the examination fee, or proof
of its payment, and by such proof of moral character, general
training, and professional study as the statute and the rules of the
board require. Sometimes it is provided that the applicant shall file
with the board an unmounted photograph of himself, recently taken,
on the reverse of which he has written his name in the presence of
an official authorized to administer oaths, who has certified by hand
and seal that the person whose name appears on the photograph, is
known to him to be the person. shown in the photograph, and that
the signature was written in his presence.1 4 It is very generally pro-
vided that the examinations of the board shall be written, or both
the homeopathic, two from the eclectic, and one from the school known as the physlo-
medical. Public Acts, 1899, p. 369. It may be suggested that in this state provision is
made for a separate state board of osteopathic registration and examination. See Public
Acts, 1903, p. 209. In New Jersey the board of medical examiners, consisting of nine
members, is made ul) of "five old-school physicians, three homeopaths and one eclectic."
2 General Statutes of New Jersey, p. 2084. Boards constituted like tfhose above described
will be found in Arizona, Idaho, Illinois, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Minnesota, Nebraska.
Nevada, Ohio, Oregon, South Dakota. Tennessee, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Vlrginia and
Wisconsin. See "Laws (abstract) regulatihg the Practice of Medicine in the United
States and Elsewhere" (12th Ed.), published by American Medical Association, under
provisions given in regard to the named states. In Massachusetts the medical board
consists of seven members, not more than three of whom shall at one time be members
of any one chartered state medical society. See i Rev. Laws of Mass. (1902), p. 683.
And In North Dakota the board consists of nine members, two of whom must be home-
opathic and one a lawyer. Revised Codes of North Dakota (x9os), § 294.
2 In Pennsylvania, for example, the statute provides for three separate hoards of
medical examinets. one representing the medical society of the State of Pennsylvania,
one, the homeopathic medical society of the state, and the other, the state eclectic medi-
cal society. 3 Purdon's Digest (13th Ed.), 3514, § 20. In New lHampshire, also, there
are three separate state boards of medical examiners, representing respectively the three
schools named above. Laws of New Hampshire, 1897, c. 63, § 2, Public Statutes and
Session Laws of New Hampshire (Ed. 19o), pp. 426, 427. Similar provisions will be
found in Arkansas, Connecticut. District of Coliombia and Georgia; while in Delaware.
Florida, Louisiana, South Carolina and Maryland there are two separate state boards of
medical examiners, namely, a regular board, so called, and a homeopathic board. See
"Laws (abstract) regulating the Practice of Medicine in the United States and Else-
where" (r2th Ed.), published by American Medical Association, pp. 23, 26, 28, 29, 30.
46, 49.
23 This is the case in Illinois- (Hurd's Rev. Stat., 1903, p. 1232, § 6), Iowa (Code,
1897, c. 17, § 2576), Mississippi (Thompson's Ann. Code, c. 104, § 3243), Missouri (Rev.
Stat., x899, vol. 2, c. r28, § 8507), New Mexico (Comp. Laws, x897, § 3695), Oklahoma
(Rev. Stat., 1903, c. 9, § T4), and West Virginia (West Va. Code, x9o6, and Supple-
ment, 907, §4386).
-24 There is such a rule in Illinois, Indiana. Kentucky and New Jersey. See Laws
(abstract) regulating the "Practice of Medicine in the United States and Elsewhere"
(12th Edition), published by the American Medical Association, pp. 33, 36, 37, 43, 44,
and 66.
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written and oral, and that a certain per cent of excellence must be
attained by the applicant in order that he may be given his certificate
or license. It is usual also for the statute to name the subjects upon
which candidates must pass examinations.
The minimum preliminary training that the applicant for admis-
sion to the practice of medicine must have at the present time is, in
a majority of the states, a high-school course of four years, or its
equivalent. But in a few of the states no provision is made by law
for preliminary training, and apparently candidates may be admitted
to practice without such training, provided they have the requisite
medical knowledge. Where such training is required, the applicant
must show to the board of medical examiners, either by an examina-
tion or by the production of a diploma or certificate that the board
can approve, that he possesses the requisite general knowledge.15
In most of the states, the statutes now require. as a basis for a.
license to practice, not only an examination before the state medical
board, but, also. as preliminary to such examination, satisfactory evi.-
dence of graduation from an approved medical college. This is
apparently the rule now in all but five states. What must be the-
standard of a medical college in order that it may be approved by a
medical board, may depend either upon the rules of the board or
upon the medical law of the state.1 6
By some statutes it is provided that the license to practice, upon
the, successful passing of the required examinations, shall be issued
by the examining board directly, by others the certificate of the
board operates as a license, and by others still, the certificate of the
-board entitles the holder to a license upon his presenting it to a
named officer and paying the license fee. Ordinarily the holder of
a license is required to record it in a designated public office, usually
that of the county clerk or that of the clerk of the county court, of
the county in which he intends to practice, paying for such recording
the fee provided 'by statute. It should be mentioned, also, that the
statutes usually require the payment of an examination fee. But in
some states there is only one fee for the examination and license.
Reciprocity is provided for by statute in many of the states by
which a person duly licensed in one reciprocating state may be
admitted to practice in another. But the measure, as a rule, is not
5 See table showing the essential features of the state medical laws, p. 124 of "Laws
(abstract) regulating the Practice of Medicine in the United States and Elsewhere"
(12th Ed.), published by American Medical Association.
N See table showing the essential features of the state medical laws, p. 124 of "Laws
(abstract) regulating the Practice of Medicine in the United States ana Elsewhere"
(12th Ed.), published by American Medical Association. The statutes of Alabama.
Arkansas, Massachusetts, Mississippi, Rhode Island and Tennessee provide for an
examination only.
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mandatory, and an examining board may, in its discretion, inquire
into the qualifications of an applicant, and, if not satisfied, refuse
him a license. Reciprocity may be either upon the basis of an exami-
nation, that is to say, the applicant must have received his license
after an examination before the board of the state from which he
cohnes, or upon the basis of a diploma, where the applicant has been
admitted to practice in the state from which he comes on a diploma
from a reputable medical college and without examination. This
basis is intended to meet the cases of persons who were registered
regularly in another state prior to the date when the state receiving
them through reciprocity required ai examination.16a Reciprocating
states require that the applicant for a license upon the basis of hav-
ing been admitted to practice in another state, should sh'ow, in the
way designated, either by statute or by the examining board, that he
is a person of good moral character. Some of them require, also, a
showing of reputable practice for a designated length of time, and
some, a membership, usually for at least a year, in a recognized medi-
cal society. Admission through reciprocal relations involves the pay-
ment of the fee fixed by statute.
The medical acts usually exempt from their operation certain
classes of persons. As a rule the act specifies that it shall not apply
to those administering domestic or family medicines, to those ren-
dering gratuitous services in cases of emergency, to commissioned
surgeons of the United States army, navy or marine hospital service,
or to legally qualified consulting physicians or surgeons from other
states or territories.1 7  Some acts provide that they shall not apply
to practitioners of a stated number of years' practice 1 Others con-
26a For exapiple, In Iowa reciprocal relations have been provided for by statute both
on the basis of an examination and on the basis of a license issued without examination
to the holder of a diploma from a medical college recognized by the Iowa board as in
good standing, the date of said diploma being prior to the legal requirements of the
examination test in Iowa. See Laws of Iowa, 3o G. A. 1904, p. io6. Similar provisions
will be found in other states. And propositions as a basis of reciprocal medical regis-
tration, adopted by the American Confederation of Reciprocating Examining and Licensing
Medical Boards are along the same lines. See "Laws (abstract) regulating the 'Practice
of Medicine in the United States and Elsewhere" (zxth Ed.), published 1)y American
Medical Association, pp. 122, 123. In this publication will be found quite a full explana-
tion of reciprocity, together with a table showing between what states reciprocity now
exists.
17 The Michigan exemption, which may be taken as a type, is as follows: "This act
shall not apply to the commissioned surgeons of the United States army, navy or
marine hospital service, in actual performance of their official duties, nor to regularly
licensed physicians or surgeons from out of this state, in actual consultation with phy-
sicians of this state, nor to dentists in the legitimate practice of their profession, nor to
temporary assistants in cases of emergency, nor to the domestic administration of family
medicines," etc., etc. See Public Acts of Michigan, 1899, p. 373.
is See, for example, Public Statutes of Vermont (igo6), § 5372. A provision of this
kind is not an unusual one.
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tain a more liberal exemption clause than any to which reference has
been made, including therein physicians residing on the border of a
neighboring state and who are authorized to practice therein and
persons practicing methods of healing that are not ordinarily recog-
nized as regular.19 In some of the states practitioners of osteopathy
are specially exempted from the operation of the medical act, and
where this is the case, we usually find a statute regulating the prac-
tice of osteopathy. But in many of the states there is no special pro-
vision exempting the osteopathist, and the courts are not in harmony
upon the question of whether or not he can be regarded as a practi-
tioner of medicine and so subject to the provisions of the medical act
of the state in which he resides and practices. The decision of the
question must, of course, depend largely upon the wording of the
statute, but an examination of the cases will disclose the fact that
practically the same language has been construed differently in dif-
ferent states.20 The dentist is not subject to the medical legislation,
his practice being usually regulated by special acts.
In most of the states the medical statute defines what shall be
regarded as the practice of medicine within the meaning of the act.
In some of the states the. definition is narrow and for that reason the
statute does not reach many irregular practitioners.2 1  And not
infrequently the definition has been made more narrow by the con-
struction put upon it by the courts.2 2  But in other states the defini-
19 The exemption clause of the New Hampshire medical act may serve as an example
of the more liberal kind. In addition to the exemptions for which provision is ordinarily
made, it states that the law shall not apply to "any one while actually serving on the
resident medical staff of any legally incorporated hospital," * * * or to "any phy-
sician residing on a border of a neighboring state and duly authorized under the laws
thereof to practice medicine therein, whose practice extends into this state, and who
does not open an office or appoint a place to meet patients or receive calls within this
state" or "to the regular or family physician of persons not residents of this state, when
called to attend them during a temporary stay in the state, or to the hotel physidan reg-
ularly employed by the landlord of the summer hotel in the care of his guests or
employes" or "to clairvoyants or to persons practicing hypnotism, magnetic healing,
mind cure, massage, Christian Science, so called, or any other method of healing, if
no drugs are employed or surgical operations performed, provided such persons do not
violate any of the provisions of this act in relation to the use of M. D., or the title of
doctor or physician." Public Statutes and Session Laws of New Hampshire (igoi),
p. 427. § Ix.
2 See I MIcHXAw TAW Rvisw, p. 309; 2 MICHIGAN LAW REviiw, p. Sc; 4 MICHI-
GAN LAw REview, p. 376.
21 For eample, the Georgia statute provides that "any person shall be regarded as
practicing medicine or surgery * * * who shall prescribe for the sick or those in
need of medicine or surgical aid and shall charge or receive therefor money or other
compensation or consideration, directly or indirectly, provided, however, that midwives
and nurses shall not be regarded as practicing medicine or surgery." I Code of Georgia,
§ 1490.
22 For a general treatment of the subject What is the practice of medicinc? in which
the holding of the courts is fully shown, see 5 MICHIGAN LAw Rrvxzw, p. iS, and 7
MICHIGAN LAW RzvxEW, p. 154.
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tion is broad and comprehensive in its terms and reaches irregular
practitioners generally, whatever may be the system 'that they
follow.2 3
The medical laws of some of the states provide against the employ-
ment of solicitors, cappers, or drummers for the purpose of procuring
patients, and against the payment of money or the making of gifts to
persons for a like purpose, and, also, against the subsidizing of hotels
or boarding houses in order thereby to secure the recommendations
of proprietors.
2 4
It is also very generally provided that the medical board must
refuse a certificate or license to a person guilty of grossly unprofes-
sional and dishonest or dishonorable conduct, and that a certificate
or license that has been issued, may be revoked by the board, if the
person fiolding it is legally shown to have been guilty of such con-
duct. In some of the medical acts the words "unprofessional and
dishonest (or dishonorable) conduct" are defined as meaning the
doing of certain things therein set forth.25  In others, they are not
defined, and the meaning of the words and their application to cases
as they arise, are questions, in the first instance, at any rate, for the
determination of the board.
23 In Delaware, for example, the 'medical law provides that "the words. practice of
medicine or surgery, shall mean to open an office for such purpose, or to announce to
the public, or to any individual, in any way, a desire or willingness or readiness to treat
the sick or afflicted, * * * * or to investigate or diognosticate, or to offer to
investigate or diagnosticate any physical or mental ailment, or disease, of any person,
or to give surgical 'assistance to, or'to suggest, recommend, prescribe or direct for the
use of, any person, any drug, medicine, appliance, or other agency, whether material or
not material, for the cure, relief or palliation of any ailment or disease of the mind or
body, or for the cure or relief of any wound, fracture, or bodily injury, or deformity,
after having received or with the intent of receiving therefor, either directly or indi-
rectly, any money, gift, or other form of compensation." It provides further that it
shall also be regarded as practicing medicine, within the meaning of the act "if any
one shall use in connection with his or her name the words or letters Dr., Doctor,
Professor, M. D., M. R., or Healer, or any other title, word, letter or other designation
which may imply, or designate him or her as, a practitioner of medicine or surgery, in
any of its branches." Laws of Delaware, 1907, p. 247.
24 See Public Acts of Michigan, 19o7, p. 2o9; Arkansas Digest of Statutes, 1904,
c. so9, § 5246.
23 For example, the medical act of Michigan provides that the Zords "unprofessional
and dishonest conduct," as used in the act, shall mean either criminal practices in con-
nection with abortion, or the giving of the assurance, for a fee, that an incurable dis-
ease can be permanently cured, or grossly improper advertising, particularly where spe-
cific mention is made of venereal diseases, or having a professional business connection
with illegal practice, or the advertising of medicine or means for the regulation or
re-establishment of the menses, or the advertising of any matter of an obscene or
offensive nature derogatory to good morals, or the employment of' solicitors or other
irregular means named for the purpose of securing patients, or "being guilty of offenses
Involving moral turpitude, habitual intemperance, or being habitually addicted to the
use of morphine, opium, cocaine or other drugs having a similar effect." This act also
makes it a misdemeanor for any persons to be gnilty of "unprofessional and dishonest
conduct," as defined therein and provides a penalty. See Public Acts of M3ichigan, r907,
p. 218.
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To secure obedience to the medical acts, a penalty is provided for
their violation. This is usually in the form of a fine or imprisonment
in the county jail, or both, in the discretion of the court. .Moreover.
in some of the states it is provided in the act that a person practicing
without a license shall not be entitled to collect fees for his services. -"
The constitutionality of medical acts.-In nearly every state the
validity of its medical legislation has been attacked in the courts. It
has been claimed that such laws invade natural rights. The argu-
ment advanced is that it is the natural right of every citizen to follow
such business or profession as lie may select, provided it be lawful.
and that any statute that interferes with the free exercise of that
right by imposing conditions in regard to qualiication that the citizen
must satisfy before he can enter upon his chosen calling, is contrary
to a fundamental principle of the organic law and cannot stand.2 7  It
has been claimed further that such laws interfere with vested rights,
that they operate to deprive a person of his property without due
process of law. It is argued that the right to continue the practice
of medicine, which one has already begun, is a vested right and a
property right that cannot, under the limitations of the organic law,
be invaded by the requirement that the practitioner must submit to
special tests provided for by statute before he can lawfully continue
his practice.2 s  It is sometimes contended that this legislation dis-
2. Such provisions will be found in Alabama (Political Code of Alabama, 1907, §1644),
Georgia (i Code of Georgia, 1895, § 1491), Kansas (General Statutes of Kansas, 1os,
§ 7229), Kentucky (Kentucky Statutes, 1903, § 261S), Louisiana (Wolff's Constitution
and Revised Laws of Louisiana, 1904. vol. 2, p. 1240, § 16), and several other states.
As to whether or not the unlicensed practitioner in the absence of such a statutory
provision can collect fees for his services, there is some conflict of authority, although
in practically all the states in which the matter has been judicially determined, it has
been held that he cannot, because the services out of which the contract arises, are
rendered in violation of the medical law. See Gardner v. Tatum, 81 Cal. 370, 22 Pac.
Rep. 88o; Haworth v'. Montgomery, 91 Tenn. 16. iS S. "W. Rep. 3og. But see Smythe
v. Hanson, 61 Mo. App. 286, in which the contrary doctrine is declared.
21 See Allopathic State Board of Medical Examiners v. Fowler, 5o La. Ann. x358,
1372, 24 So. Rep. 8o9, in which this contention was made by the attorney for the defend-
ant; see, also, State c,. Biggs, 133 N. C. 729, 731, r4 S. E. Rep. 401, 64 L. R. A. 139.
23 For example, in Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 2r4, it appeared that Dent had
been a practitioner of medicine in the state, without a diploma that would be recognized
by the board of examiners, for five years before the enactment of a law that prescribed
certain requirements with which he could not comply without further preparation.
Although he had enjoyed a lucrative practice, it had not been continued for such a
length of time that he was entitled to exemption from the requirements of the statute.
His defense to a prosecution under the statute was that the law, by taking away his right
to continue the practice of his profession, had destroyed his "vested rights" and deprived
him "of the estate he had acquired in his profession by years of study, practice, dili-
gence and attention"; that it had deprived him "of the value of his invested capital in
books, medicines and instruments." To quote further from the brief submitted by his
attorney to the Supreme Court: "For the state to enact a law forbidding a man the
enjoyment of his own house without the consent of an arbitrary board of examiners Is
-no more unjust than to provide that a man shall not enjoy the benefits of an estab-
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criminates among persons engaged in, or who are about to engage
in, the same business, and denies them equal protection and privileges
under the law; that it is in conflict with the fourteenth amendment
to the Constitution of the United States, which declares that "no state
shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or
immunities of the citizens of the United States" and also with the
second section of article four of said Constitution which declares
that "the citizens of each state shall be entitled to all 'the privileges
and immunities of citizens in the several states." To make the con-
tention more specific, it may be suggested that it is usually provided
in every medical law that certain persons shall be exempt from its
operation, for example, persons who have been in practice in the
state for a certain number of years before the law takes effect, and
physicians who come within the state for special professional work.
It is argued that, as the law does not apply to such persons, there is
an unjust and improper discrimination as against those who are
obliged to comply with the requirements of the law. It is argued
further that a law providing that no person shall practice in. the state
unless he has met the requirements of the law as to previous study
and preparation, or unless he has been in practice in the state for a
certain period, ten years, for example, immediately -before the law
takes effect, is a discriminating law and unconstitutional, first, in
that it admits those who have practiced ten years, but excludes those
who have practiced for a shorter period, even though the difference
in time be slight; second, in that it admits those who have practiced
for the requisite period in the state, but excludes those who have
practiced for the same period in other states; and third in that such
a law makes a distinction between those who have practiced in the
state continuously during the stated time, immediately preceding the
passage of the act, and those who have practiced just as long or
longer in the state, but not continuously dtiring the stated time and
immediately before the law went into effect.2 9  Medical acts are
sometimes attacked also upon the ground that they are ex post facto
laws and therefore cannot stand.80
lished practice without a like consent. In either case he is deprived of his vested rights
and property by a process rather ministerial than judicial and wholly different from
that which is meant by due process of law, the judgment of his peers, or tfie law of the
land." A similar claim was made by the relator in State ex rel Burroughs v. Webster,
z59 Ind. 6o7, 5o N. E. Rep. 75o, 41 L. IR. A. 212.
-' For cases in which arguments like those suggested in the text were advanced see
Ex parte Spinney, so Nev. 323; Harding v. People, io Colo. 387; Williams v. People,
121 Ill. 84; People v. Phippin, 70 Mich. 6; State ex rel. Walker v. Green, 112 Ind. 462,
14 N. E. Rep. 352; State v'. Randolph, 23 Oregon, 74, 31 Pac. Rep. 2o, 37 Am. St. Rep.
655, x7 L. R. A. 470.
3See Commonwealth v. Vasson (York County, Pa., Quarter Sessions), 3 Crim.
Law Magazine, 726, in which the medical act in question was held by the court to be
ex post facto. It should be noted, however, that the court was an hiferior one.
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But notwithstanding such attacks as the foregoing, the medical
legislation of the different states has, with a few exceptions, been
sustained as a proper and lawful exercise of the police power.3 1 For
the non-professional reader it should be explained that the police
power of the state is an authority inherent in the state to regulate
and control things that are connected with the health, comfort, safety
2IIn each of the following cases the statute was upheld as a valid exercise of the
police power: Brooks v. State, 88 Ala. 122, 6 So. Rep. goz; Bragg v. State, 134 Ala.
x65, 32 So. Rep. 767; Richardson v. State, 47 Ark. 562, 2 S. W. Rep. 187; Thompson
v. Van Lear, 77 Ark. 5o6, 92 S. W. Rep. 773, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 588; Ex parte Frazer,
54 Cal. 94; Ex parte McNulty, 77 Cal. x64, 19 Pac. Rep. 237, x Am. St. Rep. 257;
Ex Porte Gerino, 143 Cal. 412, 77 Pae. Rep. x66, 66 L. R. A. 249; Harding v. People,
1o Col. 387; Brown v. People, xx Col. 109, 17 Pac. Rep. 1o4; State v. Wordin, 56 Conn.
216, 14 AUt. Rep. 8o; Williams v. People, 121 Ill. 84, 1x N. E. Rep. 881; People v.
Blue Mountain Joe, 129 11. 370, 21 N. E. Rep. 923; Eastman v. State, xog Ind. 278,
3o N. E. Rep. 97, 58 Am. Rep. 4o0; Orr v'. Meck, iii Ind. 40, 11 N. E. Rep. 987; State
v. Webster, io Ind. 607, 50 N. E. Rep. 750, 41 L. R. A. 212; Parks v. State, i59 Ind.
211, 64 N. E. Rep. 862, 59 L. R. A. x9o; Spurgeon v. Rhodes, 167 Ind. 1, 78 N. E. Rep.
228; State v. Mosher, 78 IowA, 321, 43 N. W. Rep. 2o2; Iowa Eclectic Iedical College
v. Schrader, 87 Iowa, 659, 5 N. W. Rep. 24, 20 L t. A. 355; State v. Heath, 125
Iowa, 585, iox N. WV. Rep. 429; State v. Edmunds, 127 Iowa, 333, oz N. W. Rep. 431;
State "1. Wilhite, 132 Iowa, 226, 2o9 N. W. Rep. 730; State v. Kendig, 133 Iowa, 164,
hio N. WV. Rep. 463; State v. Wilcox, 64 Kans. 789, 68 Pac. Rep. 634; Meffert v. Medi-
cal Board, 66 Kans. 710, 72 Pac. Rep. 247, affirmed in x95 U. S. 625; Driscoll v. Com-
monwealth, 93 Ky. 393, 2o S. V. Rep. 431; Wilson v. Commonwealth, up9 Ky. 769,
82 S. W. Rep. 427; Allopathic State Board of Medical Examiners v. Fowler, 5 la.
Ann, 1358, 24 So. Rep. 8op; State v. Bohemier, 96 Me. 257, 52 AtI. Rep. 643; Scholle
v. State, 9o Md. 729, 46 Atl. Rep. 326 Manger v. Board of Examiners, 9o Md. 659, 45
At]. Rep. 891; State v. Knowles, 9o Ild. 646, 45 At. Rep. 877, 49 L. R. A. 695; Hewitt
v. Charier, 16 Pick. 353; People v. Phippin, 70 Mich. 6, 37 N. W- Rep. 888; People v.
Reefz, 127 Mich. 87, 86 N. W. Rep. 396; State v. State Medical Examining Board, 32
Minn. 324, 20 N. W. Rep. 238, So Am. Rep. 575; State v. State Board of Medical
Examiners, 34 Minn. 387, 26 N. W. Rep. x257; State v. Flischer, 41 Minn. 69, 42 N. AV.
Rep. 696; State v7. Hathaway, Ix Mo. 36, 2! S. W. Rep. 5o81; Craig 1. Board of Medi-
cal Examiners, 12 Mont. 203, 29 Pac. Rep. 532; Gee Wo v. State, 36 Neb. 24!, 54 N. W.
Rep. 513; In re Roe Chung. 9 N. M. 130, 49 Pac. Rep. 9s2; Territory v. Newman, 79
Pac. Rep. 706, 68 L. R. A. 783; People v. Fulda, 52 Hun (N. Y.) 65, 67, 4. N. Y. Supp.
945; Ex parte Spinney, io Nev. 336; State v. Van Doran, 1o9 N. C. 864, 24 S. E. Rep.
32; State v. Call, 12 N. C. 643, 28 S. E. Rep. 517; France v. State, 57 Ohio St. 7, 47
N. E. Rep. 1041; State v. Ottman (Com. P1.), 6 Ohio Dec. 265; State v. Morrill, 7
Ohio Dec. 52; State v. Gravett, 65 Ohio St. 289, 62 N. E. Rep. 325, $5 L. R. A. 791;
State v. Marble, 72 Ohio St. 21, 73 N. E. Rep. 1o63; Barmore 1. State Board of Medi-
cal Examiners, 21 Oregon, 301, 308, 28 Pac. Rep. 8; State v. Randolph, _3 Oregon, 74,
31 Pac. Rep. 201, 37 Am. St. Rep. 655; Cotnimonwealth v. Taylor, z Kulp (Pa.) 364;
Commonwealth w. Wilson, 19 Pa. Co. Ct. Rep. 521, 6 Pa. Dist. Rep. 628; Common-
wealth v. Finn, xr Pa. Super. Ct. 620; Commonwealth v. Densten, 3o Pa. Super. Ct. 63!;
Commonwealth v. Densten, 217 Pa. St. 423, 66 At. Rep. 653; O'Neil v. State, xxS
Tenn. 427, 9o S. V. Rep. 627; Logan v. State, 5 Texas App. 3o6; Kenedy v. Schultz,
6 Texas Civil App. 641, 25 S. W. Rep. 66 ; Dowdell v. McBride, 18 Texas Civil App.
645, 45 S. W. Rep. 397, affirmed 92 Texas, 239, 47 S. W. Rep. 524; Stone v. State,
(Texas Cr. App.) 86 S. W. Rep. 1o29; People v. Hasbrouck, ix Utah 291, 39 Pac. Rep.
918; Fox v. Territory, 2 Wash. Ter. 297, 5 Pac. Rep. 603; State v. Carey, 4 Wash. 424,
30 Pac. Rep. 729; State v. Dent, 25 AV. Va. x; State v. Curreas, xxx Wis. 431, 87 N. w.
Rep. 561, 56 L. R. A. 252; Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114; Hawker v. New York,
170 U. S. x89; Reetz v,. Michigan, 188 U. S. 5oS.
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and welfare of the public. The regulation and control may have to
do with person or with property or with both. And the right of
regulation and control includes the right to prohibit, where the public
exigency calls for the exercise of such a right. It has been said that
the police power is co-extensive with the necessity for public self-
protection. The power has been called the "law of overruling neces-
sity.
32
It .need not be suggested that the practice of medicine is inti-
mately connected with the health and well being of the people of the
state. Properly regulated, it becomes a source of great and wide-
spread benefit, but without regulation, it may become the source of
grave harm and far-reaching danger. And so, in order that the peo-
ple may be safe-guarded in this respect and be reasonably sure of
receiving intelligent medical treatment, the state, by virtue of its
inherent power, enacts regulations for the examination and registra-
tion of physicians and surgeons and for the practice of the profes-
sion. Such legislation, if reasonable in its provisions, violates
neither state nor national organic law. It does not unwarrantably
interfere with the natural rights of the citizen to follow the calling
of his choice, because all callings that are public or quasi-public in
their nature, must yield to such reasonable regulations as the public
health, safety and welfare demand. So long as the conditions
imposed are reasonable and apply to all alike who desire to enter or
follow the calling, they do not violate any fundamental right.83 It
undoubtedly would be more nearly correct to speak of the practice of
medicine, or any other quasi-public calling, not as a right to which
the citizen is entitled, but rather as a privilege, in regard to the exer-
32 For definitions of the police power see Lake View v. Rose Hill Cemetery Co., 70
Ill. 191, 22 Am. Rep. 71; State v. Noyes, 47 Me. i89; Thorpe v. Rutland, etc. R. R.
Co., 27 Vt. 140; Commonwealth v. Alger, 7 Cush. 53, 84, 85, 86.
-" "It is undoubtedly the right of every citizen of the United States," says the court
in Dent v. West Virginia, x29 U. 'S. 554, 12r, "to follow any lawful calling, business,
or profession he may choose, subject only to such restrictions as are imposed upon all
persons of like age, sex and condition. This righ' may in many respects be considerea
as a distinguishing feature of our republican institutions. Here ail vocations are open
to every one on like conditions. All may be 'pursued as sources of livelihood, some
requiring years of study and great learning for their successful prosecution. The interest,
or, as it is sometimes termed, the estate acquired in them, that is, the right to continue
their prosecution, is often of great value to the possessors, and cannot be arbitrarily
taken from them any more than their real or personal property can be thus taken.
But there is no arbitrary deprivation of such right where its exercise is not permitted
be'cause of a failure to comply with conditions imposed by the state for the protection of
society. The power of the state to provide for the general welfare of its people autho-
rizes it to prescribe all such regulations as, in its judgment, will secure or tend to secure
them against the consequences of ignorance and incapacity as well as of deception and
fraud."
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cise of.which the state may impose such reasonable conditions as the
protection and welfare of the public seem to demand.
3 4
In answer to the contention that the medical statute that imposes
conditions that must be met by those already engaged in practice as
well as by those who contemplate practice, interferes with vested
rights and operates to deprive persons of their property without due
process of law, the courts with remarkable unanimity have held that
such legislation does not interfere with vested rights -because it does
not deprive any person or class of persons of the right to begin, or
continue in, the practice of medicine; it simply provides that in order
to do so, one must comply with such requirements as the protection
of the public demands. And the courts with the same unanimity
have held that such legislation does not operate to deprive persons
of their property without due process of law, because, even though it
be conceded that the right to continue the practice of medicine is a
property right, such right must, according to fundamental principles,
always be exercised under such regulations and restrictions as the
protection of the public demands. 35 In order to make a medical law
U See State v. Edmunds, 127 Iowa, 333, 339, 1oi N. W. Rep. 431; Allopathic State
Board of 'Medical Examiners v. Fowler, So La. Ann. 1358, 1373, 1374, 24 So. Rep. 809.
In this case the court says: "Whenever the pursuit of any particular occupation or pro-
fession requires for the protection of the lives or health of the general public, skill,
integrity, knowledge or other personal attributes or characteristics in the person pur-
suing it, the general assembly has the power and the autliority to have recourse to
proper measures to ensure that none but persons possessing these qualifications shoulid
pursue the calling. We find this right constantly put in force by the general as well
as the state governments. * * * * * There is no more natural, absolute right in
a person to practice medicine or surgery than there is to practice law. What is claimed
to be a natural or absolute right, is nothing more than a privilege or a right upon con-
ditions."
25"It would not be deemed a matter for serious discussion," says the court in Dent
,. Vest Virginia, 129 U. S. 114, 123, "that a knowledge of the new acquisitions of the
profession, as it from time to time advances in its attainments for the relief of the sick
and suffering, should be required for continuance in its practice, but for the earnestness
with which the plaintiff in error insists that, by being compelled to obtain the certificate
required, and prevented from continuing in his practice without it, he is deprived of
his right and estate in his profession without due process of law. We perceive nothinz
in the statute which indicates an intention of the legislature to deprive one of any of
his rights. No one has a right to practice medicine without having the necessary quali-
fications of learning and skill; and the statute only requires that whoever assumes, by
offering to the community his services as a physician that he possesses such learning and
skill, shall present evidence of it by a certificate or license from a body designated by
the state as competent to judge of his qualifications." See, also, State v. Currens, Ti
Vis. 431, 87 N. V
r
. Rep. 561; Meffert v. Medical Board, 66 Kans. 710, 72 Pac. Rep.
247. affirmed in 195 U. S. 625; State -,. Bohemier. 96 Me. 257, 52 At. Rep. 643, in
which the constitutionality of the state medical act is sustained and it is also held that
the state could not, under tie provisions of its statutes, contract, through a legislative
act, with a medical society that its regular licensees should be admitted to practice with-
out being subject to additional limitations unless Imposed by the society itself, in such
a way as to prevent a subsequent legislature from revoking tie contract, and that the
general medical act, requiring all practitioners to be licensed, which was subsequently
passed, although it would operate to revoke such a contract, if there were one, would
not impair the obligation of any contract.
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effective, then, the legislature may require that one having an estab-
lished practice and one contemplating practice should conform to the
same standard. It is easy to see that if the state, acting through its
public legislative assembly, did not possess this power, it would be
seriously handicapped in the exercise of its buthority as the guar-
dian of the public health and welfare.36
In order to perform what may be called the public duties of his
profession, the physician is, under the law, not infrequently called
upon to sacrifice what is essentially a property interest. For exam-
ple, a statute or an ordinance may require him, without compensa-
tion, to report to the proper authorities such of his patients as are
suffering. from contagious or infectious diseases, and impose a pen-
alty for each omission so to do. It might be claimed, upon the theory
that the-time required for the reporting of such cases would consti-
tute a property interest, that such statute or ordinance would be
unconstitutional, in tlat it would deprive the physician of his prop-
erty without due process of law. But such a claim would not be
recognized by the courts, because the state has the inherent authority
to compel such reports, in order that the spread of disease may be
prevented and the public health conserved. In such cases the right
of the-physician must be sacrificed for the public good. It has been
said that, under such circumstances "the constitutional right to com-
pensation for services stands in abeyance."37
The ordinary answer given by the courts to the contention that the
exemptions that we find in most medical laws by which certain per-
sons named, physicians for example who have been in practice for a
stated number of years, give rise to unjust and improper discrimina-
tions and thereby make such laws unconstitutional, is that simply fix-
ing requirements that all persons who purpose practicing medicine
must meet, and that all such persons by reasonable efforts may meet,
is not discrimination but regulation that the state, by virtue of its
inherent power, has the right to make; that the state has the right
to say, and may very properly say, that a certain period of actual
practice within the state, is the equivalent, so far as preparation for
practice is concerned, of a stated period of study followed by an
examination or of any other requirement that may be set forth in
the statute; that the exemption from the requirements of an act of
physicians who have been practicing for a stated length of time, does
as See State v. Gravett, 6s Ohio St. 289, 62 N. E. Rep. 325, 87 Am. St. Rep. 6os,
55 L. R. A. 791.
TSee State v. Wordin, 56 Conn. 2x6, 14 AtL Rep. 8o; see, also, Robinson v. Ham-
flton, 6o Iowa, 134, 14 N. W. Rep. 2o2, 46 Am. Rep. 63, in which a regulation of the
state board of health, provided for by statute, requiring physicians to report births and
deaths was held to be constitutional, the legislation being clearly within the police power
of the state.
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not operate as a denial of the privilege or of the right of practicing
medicine to any one; that any citizen may qualify himself, in the
manner pointed out by the law, and thereafter lawfully engage in the
practice of medicine; that an act of this kind "does not grant privi-
leges or immunities to any citizen or class of citizens either within
or without the state; it only establishes a rule of evidence by which
qualification to practice medicine and surgery is to -be determined." 38
An examination of the cases, both state and federal, bearing upon
the question, will show that these constitutional limitations in regard
to the privileges and immunities of citizens are never construed in
such a way as to deprive the states of their power so to control the
conduct of individuals as to protect the welfare of the community.
There must necessarily be what from some points of view might be
regarded as class legislation. If the protection of the community as
a whole requires that people following a particular calling should
reach and maintain a certain standard of preparation, the state, by
virtue of its inherent power, may fix-that standard and declare what
the legal evidences of that preparation may be. Yet the state by such
legislation in a sense imposes burdens, the burdens of preparation,
and confers privileges, the privileges that come from the following
of the calling, upon a separate class of citizens. "It has been decided
with substantial unanimity," says the supreme court of Wisconsin,
"'that upon those subjects wherein the welfare of the community at
large is jeopardized by unrestrained freedom of will and action in
every individual, the legislature may impose restraints, and that such
restraining laws are within the constitutional requirement of uni-
formity and equality between individuals, if they affect all individuals
alike with reference to the subject under consideration.."
3 9
The argument occasionally advanced, as hereinbefore suggested,
that legislation making the practice of medicine without a license a
crime is essentially ex post facto in its nature and therefore cannot
stand, is unsound for the reason that such legislation has none of
the essential qualities of an ex past facto act. "An ex post facto
law," according to Mr. Justice WASHINGTON, in United States v.Hall,
"is one which, in its operation, makes that criminal which was iot
so at the time the action was performed, or which, increases the
punishment, or, in short, which in relation to the offence, or its con-
'w See State v. Randolph, 23 Oregon, 74, 85, 31 Pac. Rep. 2oi, 17 L. R. A. 470.
a' See State ex rel. Kellogg v. Currens, Ix I Wis. 431, 436, 87 N. NV. Rep. s61, s6
L. P. A. 252. See, also, Fox v. Territory, 2 Wash. Ter. 297, s Pac. Rep. 603; Ex Porte
Spinney, so Nev. 323; Harding v. People, so Colo. 387; Williams v. People, 121 Ill. 84,
x N. E. Rep. 88x; State ex rel. Walker v. Green, 112 Ind 462, 14 N. E. Rep. 352; People
v. Phippin, 70 Mich. 6. Many of the cases cited ante note 3 bear also upon this phase
of the general questlon.
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sequences, alters the situation of a party to his disadvantage." 40 To
show that the ordinary medical law does not fall within this defini"
tion, it need only be suggested that such law never makes the physi-
cian liable for having practiced before the taking effect of the act,
but only when he attempts to practice after the act has taken effect,
in violation thereof. It is apparent that such a law does not make
an act criminal which was not so at the time it was performed; that
it does not in any way alter the situation of a physician to his disad-
vantage in regard to anything that he has done before the law
" became operative. So far as its criminal quality is concerned, such
a law is strictly prospective.
But while all this is very generally conceded in regard to most of
the essential parts of the ordinary medical act, it is nevertheless
sometimes claimed that certain parts of an act, as practically applied,
operate in an c.x- post facto manner. For example, many of the medi-
cal acts provide that the board of examiners "may refuse to grant
a certificate to any person guilty of felony, or gross immorality or
addicted to, the liquor or drug habit to such a degree as to render
him unfit to practice medicine or surgery, and may, after notice and
hearing, revoke the certificate for like cause." In a state where such
a provision was in force, the medical board revoked a certificate for
gross immorality which was committed before the passage of the
law under which the proceeding was taken, and it was claimed by
the physician affected that the provision, if made to apply to such
immorality, would be ex post facto, because punishing him for some-
thing which took place before the statute was in force and which
was not then an act that, before the law, affected his status as a phy-
sician. The following answer to the contention was given by the
court: "Conceding that the evidence introduced before the state
board of medical examiners related to acts of immorality occurring
before the passage of the law creating the board, does it follow that
the law is ex post facto as applied to plaintiff in error? An ex post
facto law is one that imposes a punishment for an act that was not
punishable at the time it was committed, or imppses an additional
punishment to that then prescribed, etc. The revocation of a license
to practice medicine for any of the reasons mentioned in the statute
was not intended to be, nor does it operate as, a punishment, but as
a.protection to the citizens of the state. Such requirements go to his
qualifications. * * * * If the revocation were intended as a
punishment, there might be force in this argument, but since the
only purpose of the law was to require a certain standard of morals
" See United States v. Hall, 2 Wash. C. C. 366; Calder v. Bull, 3 Dall. 386; Kring
v. Missouri, 107 U. S. 221.
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of the physician, the argument is without force."' 4' A similar con-
clusion has been reached by the Supreme Court of the United States
in another case, although by a divided court. A New York statute
provided that practicing medicine, or attempting to practice, after
conviction of a felony, should be a misdemeanor, punishable by fine
or imprisonment or both. In a prosecution under the act, it was claimed
that, as the conviction of defendant took place before the passage of
the statute, to apply the statute to the case would be to make it in effect
ex post facto. The argument was this: that the defendant has suffered
the punishment imposed at the time of his conviction: that the right
to practice medicine being a valuable property right, to deprive
one of it would be in the nature of a punishment; therefore, if the
statute in question should be held to apply to defendant's case, its
effect would be to punish him again for an offense for which he had
once fully atoned, and that so applied, it would be cx post facto.
This view appealed to three of the justices, who, through the dis-
senting opinion of Mr. Justice HARLAN, urged, also, the additional
objection to the statute that it fails to take into account in any man-
nqr whatsoever the character of the person affected, at the time of
the passage of the statute. "The offender," says the opinion, "may
have become, after conviction, a new man in point of character, and
so conducted himself as to win the respect of his fellow-men, and be
recognized as one capable, by his skill as a physician, of doing great
good. But these considerations have no weight against the legis-
lative decree embodied in a statute which, without hearing, and with-
out any investigation as to the character or capacity of the person
involved, takes away from him absolutely a right which was being
lawfully exercised when that decree was passed." A majority of the
court, however, held that the state, by virtue of the police power, has
authority to prescribe, as prerequisites for the practice of medicine,
both qualifications of learning and of good character and to enact
that the record of a conviction of a felony should be conclusive evi-
dence of the absence of the requisite good character. "It is no
answer," says the court, "to say that this test of character is not in
all cases absolutely certain, and that sometimes it works harshly.
Doubtless, one who has violated the criminal law may thereafter
reform and become in fact possessed of a good moral character. But
the legislature has power in cases of this kind to make a rule of uni-
versal application, and no inquiry is permissible back of the rule to
ascertain whether the fact of which the rule is made the absolute test
does or does not exist.
4 2
41 Afeffert V. Medical Board, 66 Kans. 710, 722, 72 Pac. Rep. 247, affirmed without
opinion in 195 U. S. 625.
42 See Hawker v. New York, 17o U. S. 189.
MICHIGAN LAW REVIEW
In addition to the objections to medical statutes hereinbefore noted
and considered, it may be suggested that it is sometimes claimed that.
a medical law, if enforced according to its terms, would operate to
create a monopoly in favor of the medical profession, and would
thereby deprive the people of the opportunity of procuring cheap
and simple remedies from persons who are not regular practitioners,
such remedies being usually harmless and the only ones within the
reach of many, all of which would be contrary to the fundamental
principles of our institutions. 43 The answer to this contention is
that in all legislation the object of which is to protect the public by
requiring evidence of fitness before one is allowed to follow a par-
ticular calling, a class, learned and prepared in the calling, is neces-
sarily created, the members of which will do the work in the desig-
43 Such a claim as the above is not without the sanction of judicial precedent. See
State v. Biggs, 133 N. C. 729, 46 S. E. Rep. 401, 64 L. R. A. 139. In this case the
provision of the statute that was assailed defined what should be regarded as the prac-
tice of medicine for the purposes of the act in the following words: "The expression
'practice of medicine' and surgery' shall be construed to mean the management for fee
or reward of any case of disease, physical or mental, real or imaginary, with or without
drugs, surgical operation, surgical or mechanical appliances, or by any other method
whatsoever," with certain provisos as to midwives, nurses, osteopaths, etc., etc. Defend.
ant was prosecuted under the statute for practicing a system of drugless healing. The
court held that if this provision were made to apply to any excepting those who treat
diseases by medical or surgical means, it would violate the provisions of the state\con-
stitution as to "monopolies" and "exclusive privileges and emoluments," in that it
would make the practice of healing for compensation irregular excepting by the ordinary
methods of drugs and surgery. In other words, the court held that If this section of the
statute were to be enforced as it reads, everyone in the business of healing would be
obliged to meet the professional requirements imposed by the statute, although such
requirements are only necessary for those who administer drugs or perform surgical
operations, and that this would result In a monopoly. "The practice of medicine and
surgery," says the court, "in 'the usual and ordinary meaning of that term, is of the
highest antiquity and dignity. * * * * * * The public have a right to know that
those holding themselves out as members of that ancient and honorable profession are
competent and duly licensed as such. The legislature can exert its police power to that
end, because it is a profession whose practice requires the highest skill and learning.
But there are methods of treatment which do not require much skill and learning, if any.
Patients have a right to use such methods if they wish, and the attempt to require an
examination * * * * for the application of such treatment is not warranted by any
legitimate exercise of the police power. The effect would be to prohibit to those who
wish it those cheap and simple remedies, and deprive those who practice them of their
humble gains, by either giving a monopoly of such remedies to those who have the title
of M. D., or prohibiting the use of such remedies altogether, neither of which results
the legislature could have contemplated, and both of which are forbiflden by the pro.
visions of the constitution above cited." It should be suggested that the same court had
theretofore held that the state medical law, without the provision hereinbefore quoted,
which law required an examination and certificate as to competency of all persons enter-
ing upon the practice of medicine, was valid, as a proper exercise o*f the police power.
See State v. Van Doran, iop N. C. 864, 14 S. E. 32; State v. Call, 121 N. C. 643,
28 S. E. Rep. 517. In this last case the court said of the examination and certificate-
"To require this.is an exercise of the police power for the protection of the-public
against incompetents and bmpostors, and is in no sens" the creation of a monopoly or
special privileges. The door stands open to all who possess the requisite age and good
character and can pass the examination which is exacted of all applicants alike."
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nated field, but a monopoly in the proper sense of that term is not
thereby created, because the legislature has in view not the benefit
of those following the calling, but the safe-guarding of the public.
The medical legislation that is now so generally found upon our stat-
,ute books, undoubtedly tends to protect regular practitioners from
competition in business, but it should be remembered that the pur-
pose of the legislation is the protection of the public from poorly
prepared physicians, quacks and pretenders and not the benefit of
the profession in a pecuniary way. Any benefit of this kind that may
come to the regular practitioners from the legislation, is incidental."
As hereinbefore shown, the medical laws of some of the states
provide against the employment by physicians of solicitors or agents
for the purpose of procuring patients.45 This practice is probably
more common at the various health resorts of the country than else-
where, but it is by no means confined to them. It is a practice that
reputable members of the profession condemn, and it has been very
largely through their efforts that legislation against it has been
secured. But the validity of this legislation has been attacked upon
the ground that, as the practice of medicine is a lawful occupation, to
make it a crime to solicit practice is an unwarranted interference
with the constitutional rights of the physician. It is argued that the
rights of the physician to push his business, which is perfectly legiti-
mate, through agents and solicitors, should not be taken away by
legislation, when entire freedom in that regard is accorded to those
who are following other lines of acivity-to the merchant or manu-
facturer, for example; that to do this is to create an unjust discrimi-
nation between citizens, which is contrary to the organic law. While
it is generally conceded by those so contending that the state has
the power to regulate the practice of medicine and surgery, yet they
claim that "no general powers to make needful regulations can
include special rights to interfere with lawful business." The
obvious answer to this argument is that the practice of medicine is
very different from the business of merchandising or manufacturing
-nd from any business, indeed, that has to do with property simply
and is essentially private in its nature. The practice of medicine has
to do immediately with the health of the people, and. for this reason,
it is a quasi-public occupation. By virtue of the police power it may
be regulated to such an extent as is necessary for the protection of
the public; and that the public may need protection from the solici-
tations of agents sent out by unscrupulous practitioners must be
quite apparent when we call to mind the probable results of such
4" See Lincoln Medical College v. Poynter, 6o Nebr. 228, 82 N. IV. Rep. 855.
4See ante, p. 302.
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practices. It is not likely that a physician would hire an agent to
secure patients and then treat those patients in exactly the same way
that he would treat patients coming to him voluntarily. If one of
the latter did not need medical treatment, the physician would tell
him so at once and send him about his business. But would he do so
in the case of a patient sent to him by a paid agent? -Is it to be
expected that he would pay for securing the patient and then send
him away without treatment even though an examination should
prove that he did not need treatment? These questions must cer-
tainly be answered in the negative. And if the person who is not
really in need of a physician may be imposed upon by such practices
and thereby suffer injury, it is quite apparent that the danger to the
.sick from this source must be even greater. Such a method of secur-
ing patfents must inevitably result not only in fraud but in grave
danger to the health and well being of many people, and legislation
to prevent it certainly has a substantial basis in reason.4 6
While the courts have very generally sustained the medical legis-
lation of the different states, as is apparent from the foregoing, they
have in a few instances refused to sanction certain features of this
legislation. For example, a New Hampshire statute provided that
the requirements thereof for a license to practice should "not apply
to persons who have resided and practiced their profession in the
town or city of their present residence during all the time since
January I. 1875."' The statute took effect January I, 1879. It is
apparent, then, that all physicians except those who had practiced
all the time between the dates named, in one place in the state,
would be subjected to the requirements of the statute. It is appar-
ent, also, that this legislation imposed a burden upon one class of
physicians that was not imposed upon all, not because those upon
46 The argument by which this legislation is sustained is well stated by The Supreme
Court of Arkansas in the case of Thompson v. Van Lear, 77 Ark. 5o6, 515, 92 S. W.
Rep. 773, 5 L. R. A. (N. S.) 588. The court says, "The business of the physician directly
affects the public health, and it does not follow because 'the merchant, the manufacturer
and others may solicit trade through hired agents that a physician may do the same
thing. The legislature has forbidden the physician to do so, and there are, in our
opinion, sound reasons upon which to base the distinction. The law thus undertakes to
protect the physician from the temptation and the patients from the danger to which
they kvould be exposed by such a practice. When we consider liow easy it would be in
many cases for the professional drummer to impose upon sick people, and even upon
those who are well, and induce them to submit to treatment they do not neea; when we
consider that a physician who had paid for a patient would be under a strong temptation
to make a profit out of his investment, and to give, and charge for, treatment whether
the patient needed it or not; when we consider the fraud and Imposition tfiat would be
encouraged by such a method of securing patients-we easily reach the conclusion that
the law wisely prohibits a physician from seeking patronage by means of paid agents."
See, also, State v. McCreary (Ark. x9o6), 92 S. W. Rep. 775. So far as the writer iis
observed, the question as to the validity of this legislation has only been raised in
Arkansas.
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whom the burden was not imposed were exempt because of previous
practice which the legislature had declared to be evidence of acquire-
ments equal to those exacted of others who had not practiced, which
would have been a valid exercise of power, but 'because of the fact
of unchanged residence. This was very properly held to be an arbi-
trary, unjust and unconstitutional discrimination among persons sus-
taining the same relation toward the public. "The present objection,
says the court, "is not to the rule of evidence by which the statute
requires qualification to practice to be determined. It is not that
residence and practice during the specified time in. one place is made
sufficient evidence of fitness--equivalent to a diploma-rendering an
examination unnecessary. It is, that of those physicians who are
declared by the statute, or under its provisions are found, qualified
to practice, some are and others are not subjected to the burden of
obtaining a license. Exemption from the burden is made to depend,
not upon integrity, education and medical skill, but upon a con-
tinuous dwelling in one place for a certain time. The test is not
merit but unchanged residence. It is an arbitrary discrimination
permittihg some and forbidding others to carry on their business,
without regard to their competency, or to any material difference in
their situation. *' * * * This is hot the equality of the consti-
tution. ' ' 47  It has been well said that "the constitutionality of a stat-
ute cannot be sustained which selects particular individuals from a
class or lodality, and subjects them to particular rules, or imposes
upon them special obligations or burdens from which others in the
same locality or class are exempt."'"
A fundamental limitation upon legislative authority to prescribe
conditions that must be met by those who purpose entering upon, or
continuing the practice of medicine, is that the conditions must be
reasonable. Whether or not they are reasonable, is a question for
the courts. And in deciding the question the courts hold that con-
ditions are reasonable that are fit and appropriate to the end sought,
namely, the protection of the public, and are not in any way arbi-
trary or capricious. But if conditions are imposed apparently for
the purpose of discriminating against, or in favor of, a certain class,
like a school of medicine, for example, they will not be allowed to
stand.' An act discriminating against osteopaths by requiring them
4T State v. Pennoyer, 65 N. H. 113, 18 Atl. 878, s L. R. A. 7og.
4s State v. Hinman, 65 N. H. io3, x8 Atl. 194, 23 Am. St. Rep. 22. In this case a
discrimination In regard to dentists similar to the one discussed above in regard to phy-
sicians, was held to be unconstitutional.
do See State v. Vandersluis, 42 Minn. 129, 43 N. W. Rep. 789, 6 L. R. A. si9. In
this case the court states the controlling principle as follows: "If a condltion sbould be
clearly arbitrary and capricious; if no reason with reference to the -end in view could
be assigned for it; and especially, If it appeared that it must have been adopted for some
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to hold diplomas from colleges having a longer period of study than
that required of those contemplating the regular practice of medi-
cine, has, by virtue of the limitation upon the legislative authority
above suggested, been held to be void as to such discrimination." °
Furthermore, a statute should not be so broad in its terms as to go
beyond a reasonable regulation. A provision, for example, making
a license from a state board of dental examiners a prerequisite to the
owning, running, or managing of a dental office would be unconsti-
tutional. It would not be a proper exercise of the police power, since,
for the protection and well being of the public, technical knowledge,
for the conducting of the business side of such an office is not neces-
sary.5
1
The advertising of remedies by physicians, or of what they can
accomplish in the way of cures, indeed, any advertising that is com-
mercial in its tone and spirit, is condemned by the ethics of the medi-
cal profession, and may subject the person who indulges in it to the
discipline of the medical society or societies with which he may be
connected. But if the statute declares that a certificate regularly
issued may be revoked for "unprofessional conduct," the medical
board would have no authority to revoke it simply because the holder
has advertised himself as a specialist in certain diseases, provided
such advertising be not of a grossly improper kind, such a kind as
would be likely to produce a deleterious effect upon the people among
whom it might circulate, even though it might be such as would be
condemned by medical societies. Even though such advertising
would be regarded by the profession as "unprofessional conduct,'
it cannot properly be so held by a medical board and so made a reason
for the revocation of a license, in the absence of anything in the
advertisement that makes it objectionable from the moral point of
view. It has been suggested in one case, though perhaps the sug-
gestion was not necessary to the decision of the case, that the legis-
lature has not, by virtue of the police power, the authority to enact
a law punishing a physician who has been regularly admitted to prac-
tice, for advertising himself as a specialist in certain diseases.5 2 But
other purpose-such, for instance as to favor or benefit some persons or class of per-
sons-it certainly would not be reasonable, and would be beyond the power of the
legislature to impose."
50 State v. Gravett, 65 Ohio St. 289, 62 N. E. Rep. 325, 87 -Am. St. Rep. 6o5, 55
L. R. A. 79r.
s' State v'. Brown, 37 Wash. 97, 79 Pac. Rep. 635, 68 L. R. A. 889, ro7 Am. St. Rep.
798, 3 'ICHIoAN LAW REVIEW, 465.
' See Ex parte McNulty, 77 Cal. 164, i9 Pac. Rep. 237. In his concurring opinion
In this case THORNTON, 3., says that the police power will not justify legislation that
will enable a medical board to revoke a regularly obtained license because the holder
thereof has violated a professional rule as to advertising. The defendant had advertised
himself as a specialist in certain enumerated diseases. "As well," says the judge, "might
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undoubtedly the words "unprofessional conduct- may properly be
declared by statute to include a certain kind of medical advertising
that is inherently objectionable, such, for example, as that in which
grossly improbable statements are made or that in which specific
mehtion is made of venereal diseases. At all events, such a statu-
tory provision has not as yet, so far as the writer has observed, been
judicially declared to be objectionable.
In conclusion it may be said that if statute regulations in regard
to admission to the practice of medicine, or the continuance in prac-
tice, are adopted in good faith, are reasonable and operate equally
upon all alike who desire to practice, may be met by reasonable study
and application, and are such as will probably accomplish the object
in view, namely, the protection of the public, then they will be
declared valid by the courts, even though the conditions imposed
may be rigorous and, in the opinion of the court, inexpedient and





the board declare that wearing any other hat than- one of a white color, by a physician,
should be unprofessional conduct, and cause it to be punished as a misdemeanor. The
advertisement of the character mentioned does no harm to anyone. It may be of benefit
to the public by giving to the subjects of the diseases mentioned, information of the
existence and residence of a person whio has peculiar skill in curing them. * * * *
Professional etiquette prescribed by a class of men so eminent in standing as the medi
cal practitioners of our state is a matter to be regarded and respected, but it has its
limits, and I cannot conceive that a violation of it by a competent physician can ever be
by the state made a penal offense. The rules in regard to such etiquette between the
members of the medical as between those of the legal profession must find their enforce-
nent from a source other than the state."
53 Dent v. West Virginia, 129 U. S. 114; State v. Vandersluis, 42 Minn. 129, 43
N. W. Rep. 789, 6 L. R. A. iig; State v. Currens, iI vis. 431, 87 N. W. Rep. 561.
56 L. R. A. 252.
